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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

\\lEBER BASIN WATER
CONSERVANCY DISTRICT,

Plaintiff and Respondent,
Case No.
vs.

9317

LOIS A. HISLOP, et al.,

Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
As part of its over-all water development program, the
Weber Basin Water Conservancy District determined it necessary that the Pineview Reservoir should be enlarged so as to
accommodate additional storage water. In the course of the
enlargement, it became necessary for it to condemn certain
lands in the Ogden Valley area. These lands included certain
lands owned by the defendant, Lois A. Hislop. She duly an-
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swered the complaint in the matter, setting forth her damages
for certain lands taken from her and, by way of a counterclaim,
affirmatively alleged that a certain real property business establishment, known as ((Jack's Shack," which was located on the
main arterial highway between Ogden and Huntsville, had
suffered a diminution in value because the enlargement of the
reservoir necessitated the re-routing of traffic through and
passed the Town of Huntsville in lieu of the route which
the traffic formerly traveled in passing her business establishment.
Mrs. Hislop took the position that, although no part of
the real property constituting her business establishment had
actually been taken or direct!y touched by the condemnation
proceedings or the enlargement of the reservoir, she nonetheless sustained a damage to her property which is peculiar to
her and greater than the inconvenience suffered by the rest of
the community in and around the Town of Huntsville, and
which is just as direct and actual as the damage which she
received when her farm and pasture lands were condemned
tn formal proceedings.
A sketch of the area involved, showing the former highway route and the re-location highway route, is set forth on
Page 20 to assist the court in viewing the physical changes
brought about by the enlargement of the reservoir as the changes
affected this appellant.
The parties to the action entered into a stipulation setting
forth the facts as the same were involved in appellant's counterclaim (R. 6), and each moved the court for summary judgment
in its favor. The stipulated facts are as follows:

4
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"1. That the issue of whether or not defendant is

entitled to compensation for damages to her property
caused by the re-location of Highway No. 39 into the
Town of Huntsville, Utah, be submitted to the court
for determination by summary judgment upon oral
argument, written brief and the agreed facts as set out
more particularly in Paragraph 2 of the stipulation.
2. The defendant, prior to the enlargement of the

Pineview Reservoir, operated a tavern which was
situated adjacent to the main highway which enters
the Town of Huntsville at a point on said highway
approximately one block north of where the highway
enters the incorporated city limits, as is indicated by
an "X" mark in red pencil on the map attached hereto,
and by reference made a part of this stipulation. The
original road is indicated on said map by a brown
pencil line and the new location of the road by a red
pencil line. Access to the highway from defendant's
property was unrestricted and convenient, the property
being situated adjacent to the highway with no obstructions. The flow of traffic over the highway was a factor
in the successful operation of defendant's business, as
said highway was the route traveled by persons desiring
to communicate between Ogden and the Town of
Huntsville, or residential or recreational areas adjacent
to the Town of Huntsville.
The enlargement of the Pineview Reservoir by
plaintiff necessitated the flooding of the roadbed leading into the Town of Huntsville at its present level
and, at the request of the plaintiff and pursuant to an
agreement between the plaintiff and the State of Utah,
the road was re-located so as to by-pass most of the
residential and commercial portions of the Town of
Huntsville. The new road joins the original highway
at a point approximately one mile east of defendant's
business establishment. The location of the new highway adds a distance of approximately two and one-half
5
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miles to the distance traveled between defendant's
property and the City of Ogden, and the traffic moving
from the Ogden vicinity to the Huntsville area and to
the recreation areas adjacent to the Town of Huntsville is diverted away from the defendant's place of
business.
3. That the issue of the amount of compensation, if
any, to be awarded defendant be deferred until the
defendant's right to such compensation is established."
From a ruling of the lower court granting respondent
summary judgment on the counterclaim, appellant takes this
appeal.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
I. A RE-ROUTING OF HIGHWAY TRAFFIC OCCASIONED SOLELY BY REASON OF THE ENLARGEMENT OF A RESERVOIR WHICH SUBMERGES AN
EXISTING HIGHWAY IS NOT TRAFFIC REGULATION
UNDER THE POLICE POWER.
II. THE CONSTITUTION AND STATUTES OF THE
STATE OF UTAH RECOGNIZE THE RIGHT TO RECOVER DAMAGES TO PROPERTY NOT DIRECTLY
TAKEN IN EMINENT DOMAIN SITUATIONS.

ARGUMENT
I.

A RE-ROUTING OF HIGHWAY TRAFFIC OCCASIONED SOLELY BY REASON OF THE ENLARGEMENT OF A RESERVOIR WHICH SUBMERGES AN
6
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EXISTING HIGHWAY IS NOT TRAFFIC REGULATION UNDER THE POLICE POWER.
Appellant maintained a very profitable beer establishment
on Highway 39 running between Ogden and Huntsville. The
establishment was located at the junction of several highways,
and its success was due to the volume of traffic which passed
by its door. As a result of re-locating the highway so that it
by-passed the establishment and the greater part of the Town
of Huntsville, only limited amounts of traffic find it convenient
to take the present route which must be followed in order to
reach appellant's establishment. Obviously, such a condition
has seriously affected the volume of business and, likewise,
has greatly reduced the value of the properties owned by
Mrs. Hislop.
It is a well-established principle of law that access rights
to and from a highway are a valuable property right:
((The overwhelming weight of authority recognizes,
as a statement of general principle, that the right of
access to and from a public highway is one of the
incidents of ownership or occupancy of land abutting
thereon, of which the owner cannot be deprived without compensation, whether the fee to the way is in
the public or the abutter." 73 A.L.R. 2d 691.
This principle has been uniformly recognized irrespective
of whether access has been wholly cut off or whether the access
has been partially removed. However, it is also generally recognized, and many cases support the proposition, that a state
in the exercise of the police power in regulating traffic for the
benefit of its citizens may re-route traffic even though, in so
doing, it diverts traffic completely beyond a business establish7
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ment of this type. If such were the instant situation, appellant
would not have appealed this decision.
This case is clearly distinguishable from cases dealing
with the right of a state to change the location of a highway
because the road in question was not re-located as a result of
a state policy or decision to suit the convenience of the traveling
public. Instead, it was moved as a direct result of the enlargement of the Pineview Reservoir and at the specific request of the
plaintiff and the United States Bureau of Reclamation, which
acted as the agent for the plaintiff in the construction of the
enlarged reservoir. This is made amply clear by the language
of the contract entered into between the United States Bureau
of Reclamation and the State Road Commission of Utah on
June 30, 1955, which provides, in part, as follows:
cc2. WHEREAS, the United States intends to enlarge

Pineview Dam and Reservoir on the Ogden River in
Ogden Canyon as a part of the Weber Basin Project
which will necessitate the relocation and reconstruction
of portions of State Highways 39 and 162 and certain
portions of County Roads between the towns of Eden
and Huntsville, Utah, and
cc3. WHEREAS, the Highway Department will re-

locate and reconstruct those portions of State Highways
39 and 162 and the County roads affected by the enlargement of Pineview Reservoir, prot,ided that the
cost thereof is assumed by the United States as a part
of the Weber Basin Project."
Further, respondent's own complaint in these proceedings
states:
CCIII. The enlarged Pineview Dam and Reservoir and
appurtenances are part of the Weber Basin Project and
will be constructed in Weber County, Utah. The conS
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struction of the said enlarged Pineview Dam and
Reservoir and appurtenances will necessitate the relocation of certain highways and roads and will require
the taking of additional lands." (Italics added).
From the foregoing admissions, it is quite clear that the
highway \Vas not re-located to suit the conveniences of the
State of Utah or any other governmental agency having police
power to regulate traffic. On the contrary, the situation is a
mere disguised proceeding under the right of eminent domain
without any intention on respondent's part to pay compensating
damages.
The situation is aptly stated in the recent case of Ackernzan vs. Port of Seattle, cited in 329 P. 2d 210 ( 1958) and 348
P. 2d 644 ( 1960), where the problem involved the flight of
low-flying aircraft from an airport over the properties owned
by ad joining owners. The land owners contended that the use
of the airspace over their properties, even though there was
no actual physical trespass upon the land itself, constituted a
taking for which the Port of Seattle should pay damages.
In deciding that the damage was compensable and that it was
not a mere exercise of the police power, the Supreme Court
of the State of Washington made the following cogent observations:
««
. the courts constantly emphasize the concepts
of ( 1) 'cregulation" under the police power, and ( 2)
««constitutional taking or damaging" under the eminent
domain power. When restrictions upon the ownership
of private property fall into the category of ««proper
exercise of the police power," they, validly, may be
imposed without payment of compensation. The difficulty arises in deciding whether a restriction is an
9
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exercise of the police power or an exercise of the
eminent domain power ... but, when private property
rights are taken from the individual and are conferred
upon the public for public use, eminent domain principles are applicable."
For the purpose of illustrating that one governmental
unit cannot absolve itself from liability to pay damages in
eminent domain by reason of contracting for its own purposes
with another governmental agency, which latter agency in the
exercise of its police power might be exempt from liability, the
following quotation from California vs. Chevalier, et al. (331
P. 2d 23 7 at P. 244-245) is quite apt:
((As to the sufficiency of the pleadings, our attention
has been directed to the Freeway Agreement between
the state and city for the acquisition of defendants'
property (Exhibit 9), the statutory provisions in the
State and Highway Code for cooperation between city
and state in relocating, closing and opening city streets
in state highway construction, and judicial recognition
of joint action in carrying out certain policies of the
state. Watson vs. Greely, 67 Cal. App. 328, 227 P.
664. Cooperation between city and state no matter
how well recognized and arpproved would not justify
a fraudulent declaration of an alleged public need and
purpose that did not exist, or an act in eminent domain
that was not bona fide.''
'
In commenting upon the protection granted to private
property under the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution,
together with the mandate upon the states made in the Fourteenth Amendment, the court inserted a quotation of Mr.
Justice Holmes:
((When this seemingly absolute protection is found
to be qualified by the police power, the natural tendency
10
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of human nature is to extend the qualification more and
more until at last private property disappears .... We
are in danger of forgetting that a strong public desire
to improve the public condition is not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the
constitutional way of paying for the change."
Quoting from a Texas case, in the same decision:
C(Property in a thing consists not merely in its ownership and possession, but in the unrestricted right of
use, enjoyment and disposal. Anything which destroys
any of these elements of property, to that extent destroys the property itself. The substantial value of
property lies in its use. If the right of use be denied,
the value of the property is annihilated and ownership
is rendered a barren right."
This court should not permit respondent to claim immunity
from liability in the instant situation merely by citing cases inval ving the proper exercise of highway re-routing under the
police power. The situation here involved is quite different,
and it is submitted that to permit respondent to cause the damage here incurred without paying compensation will open the
door to every conceivable situation whereby agencies having
the power of eminent domain will damage or destroy valuable
property rights at will without giving any regard to the effect
caused upon valuable property rights created by the citizens
of this state created through hard work and toil.

II.
THE CONSTITUTION AND STATUTES OF THE
STATE OF UTAH RECOGNIZE THE RIGHT TO
]1
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RECOVER DAMAGES TO PROPERTY NOT DIRECTLY
TAKEN IN EMINENT DOMAIN SITUATIONS.
Although this court has recently proclaimed in several
decisions that the sovereign immunity of the State of Utah
holds it apart from suit and recovery for damages in instances
of this and similar types of cases, holding that our statutory
and constitutional provisions are not self-executing, it is rather
fortunate that the respondent in this case can be reached through
a direct suit. In fact, this writer is seriously concerned about
the effect of the sovereign immunity doctrine extended to the
State of Utah in situations involving taking or damaging of
private property. The common law, which has so jealously
guarded real property rights, has sustained a great loss to its
effectiveness under the doctrine of sovereign immunity as applied to situations of this type, particularly in view of the highly
accelerated program of construction of reservoirs, highways
and similar public works in recent years.
Appellant submits that this case is governed by the constitution and the statutes of the State of Utah, which provide:
Constitution of the State of Utah, Article I, Sec. 22:
"Private property shall not be taken or damaged
for public use without just compensation." (Italics
added).
Section 78-34-10(3), Utah Code Annotated, 1953.
nlf the property, though no part thereof is taken,
will be damaged by the construction of the proposed
improvement, the amount of such damages."
The foregoing constitutional and statutory provisions
clearly recognize that damages must be ascertained and assessed
in the event private property is damaged, even though the

12
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<.:onstruction requires the taking of no part of the actual property. This appeal squarely brings the court face to face with a
factual situation which falls outside the police power regulations and also involves a defendant which cannot claim the
benefit of sovereign immunity. As such, it is submitted that the
court's decision in this case may well establish a significant
landmark in Utah jurisprudence setting forth the course of
either traveling the road of state socialism or the recognition
of private property rights.
In the foregoing Washington case of Ackerman vs. Port
of Seattle, commenting upon a provision of the Illinois constitution similar to our constitutional provision and the statute
of the State of Washington, the following statement was made:
(!under this constitutional provision, a recovery may
be had in all cases where private property has sustained
a substantial damage by the making and using an
improvetnent that is public in its character; that it does
not require that the damage shall be caused by a trespass, or an actual physical invasion of the owner's
real estate, but, if the construction and operation of
the . . . improvement is the cause of the damage,
though consequential, the party may recover."
The principle upon which damage to property similar to
the damage in the instant case is predicated is that of interference with ingress and egress to one's property and its easement rights in the highway. These rights are numerous, and are
subject only to the pre-emptive right of the state or municipality
in the valid exercise of its police power. Even then, in some
situations, eminent domain proceedings must be resorted to.
Dooly Block vs. Salt Lake Rapid Transit Co., 9 Utah 31, 33 P.
229; 33 Pac. 229.

13
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A footnote case in 18 Am. Jur., Eminent Domain, Sec.
225, Page 859, contains the following statement:

rrA village and a railroad company which, in order
to abolish a grade crossing, construct a subway, vacating
the surface crossing, thereby diverting travel from the
space between the crossing and the entrance to the
subway and depreciating the value of the abutting
business property, are liable for the injuries thereby
caused the owner." Schimmelman vs. Lake Shore and
M.S.R. Co., 83 Ohio St. 356, 94 N.E. 840.
In analyzing the cases carefully, there appears to be a
rather sharp distinction between the results of the decisions
where suit was commenced against a defendant who was someone having eminent domain power other than a state or municipality-such as the Weber Basin Water Conservancy District.
The police power of local and state governmental units, with
power to alter road systems for the public good, is almost
always present in most cases. But in situations where the municipality or the state furnished merely a means of procedure,
and where the prime movant was some agency with a special
benefit to be gained for itself or its stockholders or members,
such as the Schimmelmann case, a marked departure is found
in the cases.
Such a situation is the one before this court, where the
plaintiff in fact-rather than the State of Utah-was responsible for moving the road and for defendant's resulting damages.
Holdings similar to the Schimmelmann case, involving
suits which were brought directly against the responsible party,
are found in the following cases from Colorado and Nebraska.
14
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The facts are so nearly analogous that the cases have been
briefed for the court's benefit.

1\laJon City and Ft. D. R. Co. vs. Kennedy (Nebraska), 113 C.C.A. 412, 192 Fed. 538:
Catherine Kennedy recovered a judgment against
the railroad company for damages to her real property
in Omaha, Nebraska, caused by the vacation and closing of parts of some streets and alleys. As the parts
closed were several hundred feet distant from her
property, her means of ingress and egress were merely
impaired, not destroyed. The railroad company complained that the trial court refused to hold and to charge
the jury that there could be no recovery for a damage
not differing in kind from that sustained by the general
public.
The Eighth Circuit Court in affirming the judgment
applied the Nebraska constitutional provision on eminent domain (which is the same as Utah's covering
both ntaking" and ndamaging") as construed by the
state court and held that:
n... the property owner may recover for all special
damages in excess of that to the community at large,
that such damage may arise from a closing of public
highways not contiguous to but distant from his property, and that the measure thereof is the difference
between the values before and after the act complained of.''

Denver Union Terminal Ry Co. vs. Glodt (Colorado), 67 Colo. 115, 186 P. 904.
Action to recover damages for the depreciation of
the rental value and market value of Glodt' s property
caused by the closing and vacation of parts of certain
streets and the building of a viaduct approach. The
Glodt property did not abut the parts closed.

15
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Headnote:
''Where the closing of a street west of the square
in which plaintiff's lots were located cut off all access
from plaintiff's property to streets leading to the business section of the town in the direction plaintiffs had
been accustomed to use, which was the most convenient
way of reaching such business section, and the closing
of other streets resulted in leaving only an inadequate
and dangerous way for egress on a street occupied by
a viaduct, plaintiffs sustained such special damages as
entitled them to compensation from defendant terminal
company, for the closing of such streets."
Although there has never been a reservoir case involving
a factual situation where suit was brought against an agency
other than the state or a municipality involving a re-routing
of a highway, it has been recognized in the cases of Webber
vs. Salt Lake City, 40 Utah 221, 120 P. 503, and State Road
Commission vs. Fourth District Court, 94 Utah 384, 78 P. 2d
502, that the change in grade of an adjoining highway or the
building of a viaduct in an ad joining street both constituted
such interference with ingress and egress rights of the adjoining
properties to the highway as to give rise to a claim for compensable damages.
Considering that the Weber Basin Water Conservancy
District is enlarging the Pineview Reservoir so as to provide a
benefit for the public-at-large in the form of storage and distribution of waters for irrigation and culinary usage, and that
the re-routing of the highway was necessitated by reason of
the benefit conferred upon the public-at-large, it is submitted
that there is absolutely no practical or legal difference between
the taking of portions of appellant's lands for flooding and
16
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the reduction in value of her other properties which were not
taken-but which were seriously damaged by reason of the
re-location of the highway as a part of the project. In one
instance the lands themselves were trespassed upon by the
stored waters and in the other instance the highway leading to
her business establishment was inundated, thereby inflicting
the loss complained of. Any legal approach to the situation
which would permit recovery in one instance where an actual
physical trespass occurred, but which would deny recovery in
the other instance where the physical trespass was not direct! y
on the property itself-but nevertheless a severance of the
property from the highway traffic and which resulted in a
much less accessible approach to the traveled highway-would
seem illogical and entirely inconsistent with the demands of
modern society and the need for the law to adapt itself to
changing conditions. Were this result caused by a necessary
public highway program, we could claim no damage, but the
highway was moved solely to accommodate plaintiff's reservoir
enlargement purposes.
In the very recent Utah case of Southern Pacific Company
rs. Arthur, et al., handed down on May 25, 1960, cited in
352 P. 2d 69 3, ------------Utah 2d ____________ , Justice Wade, speaking
for the court, recognized an identical right to that urged by
the appellant in this case. There the Southern Pacific Company
destroyed forage and natural access to stream or spring waters
on one side of a mountain in western Box Elder County, making
it dangerous for sheep and lambs to cross a valley. The court
held that even though there had been no actual taking of lands
by the railroad which acquired certain sand and gravel deposits
in the valley by condemnation, the range owners were entitled

17
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to compensation for diminution of value of their land by injury
done by the Southern Pacific Company to the natural crossing
and lambing grounds.
The court quoted with approval the same reasoning cited
by appellant in this case:
((Sec. 78-34-10, U.C.A., 1953, providing the manner
in which damages must be assessed in condemnation
proceedings, reads:
CThe court, jury or referee must hear such legal
evidence as may be offered by any of the parties to
the proceedings,
and thereupon must ascertain and
,,
assess.
c

3) If the property though no part thereof is taken,
will be damaged by t~e construction of the proposed
improvement, the amount of such damages.
cc (

5) As far as practicable compensation must be

cc (

assessed for each source of damages separately."
CCThe only crossing available to the sheep from the
east side to the west side of respondents' land and vice
versa was through Little Valley, which extends from
the west lake shore due east to the head of Maple
Canyon.''
sheep can no longer cross Little Valley back
and forth naturally while in search of food and water.
The condition in which it is left is also very dangerous
to the lives of sheep and lambs which when frightened
are likely to plunge over the rim of the lands they have
been grazing and get killed. Besides the danger to lives,
which the pits have created, they have destroyed forage
and natural access to stream or spring water on the west
side of Promontory Mountain in the late winter or
spring when the snow has melted on the east side of
the mountain and it is dry.
cc

•

•

•

18
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The evidence revealed:
" ... that the damages were of a special kind to the
grazing use to which the range lands owned by respondents were fitted and therefore even though there had
been no actual taking of any lands they were entitled
to just compensation under the provisions of paragraph
3 above, for diminution of value of their lands by the
substantial injury done to the only available natural
crossing and lambing grounds.''
The foregoing pronouncement on the effect of Section
78-3-1-10, coupled with the mandate of our constitutional provision, was correctly applied in the Southern Pacific Company
vs. Arthur case. It is equally applicable to the case at bar, if
not more so.

CONCLUSION
Appellant submits that the lower court erred in granting
summary judgment in favor of respondent under the facts of
this case. Rather, the summary judgment granted should be
vacated and set aside and summary judgment should be granted
in favor of appellant and the case remanded to the lower court
for proceedings calculated to determine the amount of damages sustained to appellant's properties.
Respectfully submitted,
GLEN E. FULLER
SCOTT D. ALLEN
Attorneys for Appellant
15 East Fourth South Street
Salt Lake City, Utah

19
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